cancelled, the withheld overpayment of RM12,574.15 (including the worker’s final salary) was refunded in full on 2 July, and a corrected tax position confirming zero outstanding liability was issued on 6 July. The full resolution is documented in Case 7 (Section 5) and Section 6.7. The worker’s signed testimony records that individual, remote follow-up over nearly six months did not result in correction, while represented in-person negotiation resolved the matter within days. In another case, the worker’s final salary remained unpaid for approximately 21 months even though the CP621 had been confirmed as issued to the employer more than a year earlier. The employer’s explanation shifted over time: it first stated that an international transfer would be made, then claimed that a transfer to a Malaysian domestic account had been completed — even though the worker had already notified the employer in writing that the account was no longer usable following their return to Japan. In yet another case, a worker contacted the payroll team multiple times regarding tax clearance, but was consistently ignored, and only received a response after visiting the office in person. 4.4 Bullying, Scapegoating, and Coercive Bargaining Tactics In multiple cases, team leaders and management shifted responsibility for operational failures or financial losses onto frontline operators, while HR departments were slow to respond or refused to intervene. In one case, a worker’s spouse was terminated over a costly error without any prior discussion. In that department, two team leaders were reported to have instructed QA staff to monitor and negatively rate a colleague who was already in a disadvantaged position. Pre-departure HR harassment was documented in one case. A male HR representative sent a newly hired worker a series of intimidating WhatsApp messages (“Please reply immediately,” “You should have replied before 5,” “Why are you delaying your travel arrangements?”, “Are you there?”), while a separate female HR representative simultaneously called by phone — creating an oppressive, dual-communication situation that stemmed from the employer’s own lack of internal coordination. The worker filed a formal complaint about this conduct with the recruitment agency. At another employer, a distinctive coercive tactic was documented. At a group meeting ostensibly convened to discuss resignation dates, the employer declared that unless the worker accepted an earlier resignation date, it would not adjust the visa end dates of two other departing colleagues either. The worker described this as having “colleagues held hostage,” and accepted the terms on the spot out of concern for the colleagues’ welfare — while remaining entirely unconvinced by the tactic itself. This illustrates how an individual worker’s contractual rights can be used as leverage by tying them to colleagues’ circumstances. In yet another case, the worker repeatedly described a pattern in which the company failed to honor verbal commitments made during meetings, leading the worker to conclude that only written records could be trusted and to insist that all further communication be conducted in writing. 4.5 Algorithmic Penalization of Certified Medical Leave Internal performance-management material obtained from one employer (NTT MSC) shows that physician-certified sick leave is incorporated into a worker’s KRA (Key Result Area) attendance score. The underlying scoring table increases non-linearly, such that an eighth instance of lateness, early departure, or absence within a given period carries roughly 22 times the impact of the first. An internal compliance review of the same scoring practice — specifically, a policy of double-counting actual sick-leave occurrences when calculating the attendance score — concluded that the approach was likely improper or unlawful, and would probably be invalidated if formally challenged. An internal KPI scorecard confirmed from another employer’s Japanese-language support team shows an equivalent multi-factor scoring structure combining resolution rate, handle time, quality score, and attendance score. It further applies a rule under which falling below a minimum of 20 cases handled per day — for any reason, including medical leave — automatically results in the lowest possible rating (1 point) for that period. 4.6 Salary Bait-and-Switch and Wage Opacity In one documented case, a worker recruited through a job agency on the basis of a base salary of RM9,500 plus KPI and shift allowances received a formal offer reduced to RM8,700 — a cut of RM800. After the worker raised the discrepancy, the employer negotiated up to RM9,300, still RM200 short of the originally advertised figure. Despite the salary negotiation remaining unresolved, the employer pressed for a prompt signature on the contract. This illustrates that advertised salary figures do not always reflect the terms actually offered, and that workers who have already begun visa processing or travel preparations have reduced bargaining power. Sukimare Consulting — White Paper (July 2026) Page 7