find alternative employment to remain in the country
while pursuing a claim against a former employer.
Many dispute-resolution systems in the region also
suffered from bottlenecks and case overload, meaning
that time limits for mediation or judicial settlement –
where set out in the legislation – could not be met. Even
prior to COVID-19, court cases, whether for migrant or
national workers, could drag to several years, taking
into account appeals and enforcement orders.
Due to COVID-19 precautions, many government
departments, including courts and labour complaints
departments, closed or significantly reduced their
capacity to comply with social distancing requirements,
causing even greater delays to dispute handling. Thus,
many workers had little choice but to repatriate to their
country of origin without waiting until the resolution of
their case, or they never submitted a complaint, assuming
that such a process would be futile. In particular, while
those working for large or high-profile companies that
failed to pay dozens of workers could have benefited
from collective dispute investigations (conducted by the
Ministry of Labour or by an embassy) or perhaps greater
media scrutiny of their claims, migrants employed in
small- to medium-sized enterprises, “day labourers”
or domestic workers would have found achieving an
expedited resolution far more challenging.
With many companies in the region facing drastic cash
flow issues, it is also likely that some employers would
not have been in a position to provide departing migrant
workers with their full end-of-service gratuity payments
or benefits (which accumulate over the course of the
workers’ employment) and thus negotiated only to give
part of the amount owing.
While Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries can
be commended for having Wage Protection Systems
(WPS) in place, and in some cases insurance funds
to compensate workers in particular circumstances,
pre‑existing limitations meant that these mechanisms
were insufficient to address the full scale of the problem.
In the case of the WPS, non-compliance in wage payment
is essentially addressed through employer sanction, but
not necessarily worker compensation. Additionally, WPS
do not cover migrant domestic workers, who in several
GCC countries, comprise more than 25 per cent of total
employment. Additionally, gaps in the WPS include the
fact that the systems do not address wage manipulation
(miscalculation of overtime, end-of-service gratuity
payment) or prevent deception by an employer who
withdraws cash on behalf of the worker. 7
The scale of the challenge of ensuring that hundreds
of thousands of departing migrant workers from
the region are paid their wages and benefits, in
circumstances where even existing channels were
flawed, gave rise to a global campaign led by civil
society and trade unions, to call for an urgent justice
mechanism to recover the unpaid wages of repatriated
migrant workers and to shed light on the urgency and
vast scale of the problem. 8
2. What do international labour standards
say about wages, including in a crisis
context?
International labour standards for protecting the wages
of workers, including migrant workers, and fair labour
remuneration practices are key to the ILO’s mandate.
Non-payment or delayed payment of wages may also in
some instances give rise to forced labour practices and
a breach of fundamental principles and rights at work. 9
The Protection of Wages Convention (No. 95) and
Recommendation (No. 85), 1949, are two international
labour instruments dealing comprehensively with
the payment of wages, and seek to ensure the fullest
possible protection for workers’ remuneration. They
can be considered key instruments in setting a legal
framework and standards on ensuring wage protection.
Specifically, these instruments identify key issues to
ensure that wages are paid to all workers, including
migrant workers, irrespective of their migration status, 10
in a predictable, timely and complete manner.
As of May 2021, 99 countries have ratified Convention
No. 95, including most recently Saudi Arabia, which
ratified it in December 2020. 11
Box 1
Key principles of Convention No. 95
X
X
X
X
X
X
Workers shall be free to dispose of their
wages as they choose.
Wages shall be paid in legal tender.
In cases of partial payment in kind, the
value should be fair and reasonable.
No unlawful deductions are permitted
(right to receive wages in full).
In cases of employer insolvency, wages
shall enjoy a priority in the distribution of
liquidated assets.
Regular payment of wages, including
full and swift final settlement of all
wages within a reasonable time, upon
termination of employment.
7 ILO, Minimum Wages and Wage Protection in the Arab States: Ensuring a Just System for National and Migrant Workers (2019). Jureidini, Ray “Wage Protection
Systems and Programmes in the GCC”, in Philippe Fargues and Nasra M. Shah (eds) Migration to the Gulf: Policies in Sending and Receiving Countries, Cambridge,
Gulf Migration Research and GLMM, (2018) pp. 9-32.
8 See Justice for Wage Theft campaign.
9 ILO. Ending forced labour by 2030: A review of policies and programmes. The ILO has identified 11 core operational indicators of forced labour, including the
withholding of wages.
10 The ILO supervisory bodies have observed that Convention No. 95 applies to all persons to whom wages are paid or payable, irrespective of whether they
have a formal employment contract, or a work permit. See Libya – Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR),
Observations published between 1995 and 2001, and 2013, and Libya, Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion: 1996, Publication: 83rd ILC session (1996).
11 Other countries in the region which have ratified Convention No. 95 are Iraq, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.
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