CSO & TU Freedoms In countries of destination, apart from the public sector, several stakeholders including Missions of COO, CSO’s and trade unions (where allowed), diaspora/community organisation, faith-based organisations actively endeavour on the field to ensure protection of existing migrant rights. However, overarching gaps reported by CSO’s include lack of monitoring mechanisms for cross-collaborative efforts, lack of formal recognition of community/diaspora leaders and communities at COD and COO and lack of human and financial resources for grassroot level work. Local CSOs and community/diaspora organisations work with Missions of COO as well as departments of the police, immigration, labour and health in casework, with the former strongly involved in advocacy and consultation with government authorities. Due to the restricted presence of civil society organisations in the GCC region, community/diaspora organisations and their members play a crucial role as linkages between governmental authorities of COD and migrant workers. This is because in context where labour as a collective force has been repressed and debt-laden migrant workers are deprived of many legal-political rights, dynamics of production tend to close off spaces for agitation while opening up opportunities for informal negotiations. (Bal, 2015) In origin countries, partnerships between the public and the non-governmental sector efficient at the local and state/provincial levels, however are unable to be as prevalent in national policymaking. At the outset, in developing countries such as those in South and South-East Asia, emigrant labour is yet to be considered as a major priority compared to other predominant issues in the country (except for Philippines and Nepal where migrant workers are recognised in state rhetoric for their contributions to the nation). This detrimentally affects government interest and efficiency in migration governance and fostering effective partnerships which would mean increased responsibility and accountability to another entity. Due to these predominant gaps, governments are also seen making policy decisions with very little to no consultation with other stakeholders. In destination countries, it has been commonly observed that state understanding on CSO activity and involvement in public affairs differ and this further affects activity on the ground in terms of advocacy, if it is outside what is considered the “acceptable frame” (that other CSO’s may willingly adhere to). Bal (2015) highlights this as a feature where CSOs and advocacy groups in regimes where expression is restricted do not ‘pursue agendas to fundamentally transform the established political order but are generally geared towards reform and the promotion and protection of various rights and collective goods’. In other regimes, state actors consider CSOs as sources of technocratic problem solving. Finally, state actors also attempt to resolve or mitigate political conflicts by framing and managing these conflicts in technical and administrative terms, effectively depoliticising them. (Bal, 2015) Moreover, many governments do not respect the freedom of association and impose restrictions upon it if they do. Trade unions were also noted as being prominent in policymaking but failing to foster solidarity in addressing and advocating for migrant worker protection at the grassroot level across countries of origin and destination. For instance, certain countries of destination do not allow migrant workers to join their trade unions and trade unions in COO do not engage with migrant worker population at the risk of being perceived as ignoring the local workforce. In addition, non-compliance of governments to core labour standards also make it difficult for trade unions to form partnerships and engage in social dialogue on migration. While recent reforms to the migrant labour regime have delivered greater legal protection for migrant workers, they also need to be understood for the manner in which they depoliticise the workplace grievances of migrant workers while attempting to administratively incorporate independent voices for reform (Bal, 2015) 28